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Employment Research
and Wilhelmsson 2006) suggests that
Swedish government policy encouraging
more decentralized research activity at
newer universities may have increased
Sweden’s productivity.
Improving Local Standards of
Wage Fairness
The labor market practices of higher
education and health care institutions,
or other large local employers, may
influence beliefs in local labor markets
about the fairness of employer practices.
If a few large employers in a local
economy choose “high road” labor
market practices, with higher wages, more
internal promotion, and lower employee
turnover, other local employers may
emulate them..
However, we find that higher education
industries pay over 14 percent less than
the average industry, controlling for many
worker characteristics. On the other hand,
medical service industries pay about 5
percent more than the average industry.
These wage findings are not just due to
average pay for professors and doctors,
but also reflect wages for workers with
Bachelor’s or Associate’s degrees.
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The Bottom Line
We have sufficient research evidence
to conclude that efforts to expand
higher education or medical service
industries should not be ignored by
regional economists or local economic
developers. We estimate that, on average,
an economic development policy that
would expand the higher education
service sector by 1 percent of total local
employment would increase average
local earnings by 0.2 percent, compared
to 0.1 percent for a similar-sized
expansion in the medical services sector.
Although such earnings effects may
sound small, for the typical metropolitan
area these amount to many millions
of dollars. If the costs of inducing an
expansion in higher education or medical
services is sufficiently low, an economic
development strategy that targets these
industrial sectors may offer net benefits.
Note
1. In this article and in the research upon
which it is based, “eds and meds” is defined as
organizations and firms that provide educational
and medical services to consumers (e.g., students,
patients), such as universities, community colleges,

hospitals, and doctors’ offices. Pharmaceutical
companies, biotech research, textbook companies,
or other suppliers of inputs to these educational or
medical service providers are not included in our
definition of “eds and meds.”
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T

he design of privatization
policies and their consequences for
firm performance have been among
the most controversial issues in
postcommunist Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union. From the early
1990s, policymakers and observers saw
privatization as the linchpin of a strategy
to improve managerial incentives,
encourage firm restructuring, and
generally bring about a shift to a “private
property regime.” In many countries,
the initial enthusiasm for ownership
change led to large-scale divestment
through “mass privatization,” as well

as giveaways to employees and rapid
sales to domestic and foreign investors.
The emphasis on privatization became
decidedly less fashionable later in the
1990s, as critics argued that the programs
had either done little good but resulted
in misplaced priorities (for instance, by
neglecting institutional change) or had
actually caused damage (for instance, by
facilitating asset stripping).
Yet the evidence supporting either
of these positions was until very
recently quite weak. At the beginning of
transition, there was little or no relevant
previous experience to justify the strong
pro-privatization enthusiasm. And by the

late 1990s few systematic studies existed
to support the negative views of the
critics, who instead relied almost entirely
on either macroeconomic performance
indicators (which tended to be quite poor
through the mid-1990s in most countries)
or on anecdotes. Just as the critics’
position, which was part of a broader
attack on the “Washington consensus,”
seemed to become dominant, a surge
of statistical studies of privatized firms
began to appear, and most of these tend
to report positive effects of privatization
on measures of firm performance in many
countries (see the summary in Djankov
and Murrell [2002]). But the studies
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suffer from enough methodological
weaknesses to make them ineffective in
persuading most skeptics.
Recent research carried out under the
auspices of the Upjohn Institute provides
a firmer empirical basis for drawing
conclusions about the effectiveness of
privatization in raising productivity
(Brown, Earle, and Telegdy 2006). The
analysis overcomes the typical problems
of previous studies: incomparability
across countries, small sample sizes,
short time series, and lack of control for
selection bias in the privatization process.
The data used in the analysis consist
of firm-level information from four
countries—Hungary, Romania, Russia,
and Ukraine—that span the varieties
of privatization policies and reform
strategies among transition economies.
The set of information covers nearly all
manufacturing enterprises inherited from
the central planning period, and the time
series for each firm ranges from as early
as 1985 (in Russia) to 2002 (in all four
countries).
The large samples of firms facilitate
comparisons within industries, and the
long time series make it possible to take
into account biases in the selection of
firms to be privatized. They also allow
for the possibility that privatization
might have anticipatory effects, which
could be either positive (if managerial
incentives are increased by the expected
benefits under new owners), or negative
(if managers see little future with the
firm and resort to asset stripping).
Either type of behavior would result in
a biased estimate of the privatization
effect in a simple comparison of pre- and
postprivatization performance. Finally,
the Upjohn study applies evaluation
methods developed for labor market
programs to estimate the productivity
impact of privatization.
Privatization Policies and Results
The three main methods of
privatization are transfer to employees,
mass privatization programs, and caseby-case sales. Privatization through
employee-giveaways was common in
Russia and Ukraine, a bit less common
in Romania, and little used in Hungary
(except for some managerial buyouts).
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The method is attractive because of
its relative ease of administrative
and political implementation and the
possibility that employee ownership
may improve work incentives, company
loyalty, and support for restructuring;
widely dispersed ownership among
employees may also facilitate takeovers
by outsider investors. On the other
hand, insider privatization is frequently
alleged to be ill-suited to the restructuring
demands of the transition. Employees
may lack the necessary skills, capital,
technologies, and access to markets
necessary to turn their firms around,
and corporate governance by employees
may function particularly poorly when
the firm requires difficult restructuring
choices involving disparate distributional
impacts within the firm.
Mass privatization programs, typically
involving vouchers distributed to citizens,
have also accounted for a substantial
share of privatization in many transition

A key result of the study is
strong evidence that foreign
privatization has a bigger impact
than domestic privatization
in all four countries.
countries, including Romania, Russia,
and Ukraine, but again not Hungary. In
principle, such programs may avoid high
levels of inside ownership, but in Russia
and Ukraine they were in fact combined
with strong preferences for employees
to use their vouchers in acquiring shares
in their employers. A serious problem
with the programs is the risk of highly
dispersed ownership structures, a
problem normally addressed through the
creation of intermediaries— either by the
state as part of the program as in Poland
and Romania—or by private parties
competing for individuals’ vouchers.
The final major privatization method,
case-by-case sales of large blocks of
shares to outside investors, is the method
used most often in the West and to many
observers is the most likely to encourage
productivity-enhancing restructuring.
Hungary is rare among transition
economies in relying almost exclusively
on sales (East Germany and Estonia are
two other examples). But most countries

have used this method for some share of
privatization; in this study, sales are more
common in Romania and less common in
Russia and Ukraine. The disadvantages
of sales are related to insufficient demand
and political difficulties compounded
by problems of valuation. In addition,
sales contracts frequently include not
only a price, but also commitments
regarding investment and employment,
which are taken into account in selecting
a buyer. Although policymakers may
feel themselves politically constrained
to ensure continued employment
and operation of privatized firms,
such restrictions could have reduced
restructuring in the companies privatized
through block sales, attenuating any
potential benefits of privatization.
Among the recipients of blocks of
shares through sales, it may be important
to distinguish foreign from domestic
investors. Most observers would
probably agree that foreign owners are
likely to have better access to finance,
management skills, new technologies,
and knowledge of markets, which would
suggest a higher productivity effect when
privatization results in foreign ownership.
On the other hand, foreigners may face
special difficulties restructuring firms
in transition economies, where layoff
decisions are highly politicized, for
example, and where local networks and
knowledge of local conditions may be
unusually nontransparent. Under such
conditions, any advantage of foreign
ownership in raising productivity may
be reduced, and foreigners might even
do worse than well-selected domestic
investors.
The available data provide
information on whether the new owners
of a privatized firm are predominantly
domestic or foreign, but they do not
otherwise distinguish the methods.
Nevertheless, the policy differences
across countries suggest that the
effectiveness of privatization in raising
productivity may vary significantly. The
overall rate of privatization is shown
in Figure 1, computed on the basis of
the manufacturing firms originally state
owned in the database. As of 1992,
35.4 percent of the Hungarian firms had
already been privatized, defined here
as a strict majority of shares held in
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Figure 1 Percentage of Sample Firms Privatized, by Year
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its own idiosyncratic level of productivity
prior to privatization, and 3) including
firm-specific time trends as well as fixed
effects (FE&FT) to permit each firm its
own idiosyncratic productivity growth.
The first OLS method implicitly assumes
that firms are randomly selected to be
privatized, or at least that the selection
process is uncorrelated with productivity.
The FE approach, the second method,
permits selection to be correlated with
the level of productivity, and FE&FT,
the third method, permits selection to be
correlated also with productivity growth.
Clearly, FE&FT is quite a demanding
method, and it has not been used in
any previous research on the effects of
privatization.
The estimated effects of privatization
on productivity using these three methods
are shown in Figure 2. The vertical axis
measures the estimated proportionate
increase in productivity associated with
a change from majority state to majority
private ownership. OLS estimates are
quite large in all four countries, although
the magnitudes vary significantly across
them. But the FE estimates vary even
more, remaining large in Hungary and
Romania, but becoming small in Ukraine
and slightly negative in Russia. The
FE&FT results are further attenuated,
but they remain significant in Hungary
and Romania, with magnitudes of 0.08
and 0.14, respectively. They are negative
in Russia and small (but positive) in
Ukraine. The results therefore imply
robust evidence of large differences in

private hands, while the percentage was
only 0.2 in Romania and 0.0 in Russia
and Ukraine. By the end of the period,
however, most of the firms had been
privatized in all four countries.
Most privatized firms are controlled
by domestic investors. The percentage
of firms with majority ownership by
foreigners is by far highest in Hungary,
reaching 16 percent by 2002. In
Romania, the percentage reaches 5
percent, and in Russian and Ukraine
close to 1 percent. Although constituting
a small fraction, the numbers of
observations are sufficient, given the
sample sizes, for estimating separate
coefficients for privatization to foreign
investors.

also employs a wide range of methods
to estimate industry-specific production
functions, including simply assuming
alternative contributions of capital and
labor to output. Examination of results
shows that the estimated privatization
effects are quite robust, hardly varying
across different functional forms.
The estimation results are much
more sensitive, however, with respect
to the controls for selection into the
privatization program. Three principal
approaches are used in the study: 1)
simply pooling the data and estimating
standard ordinary least squares (OLS)
regressions, 2) including firm-fixed
effects (FE) to permit each firm to have

Estimating the Productivity Effects
of Privatization

Figure 2 Estimated Productivity Effects of Privatization
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Estimating the effectiveness of
privatization in raising productivity
requires not only excellent data, but also
careful specification of technology and
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those initially state owned. The Upjohn
study in all cases estimates privatization
effects on multifactor productivity taking
into account firm-level differences in
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Figure 3 Estimated Productivity Effects of Privatization to Foreign Investors
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the estimated privatization effect across
the four countries in the study. While the
effect is clearly larger in the two former
Soviet “satellites” than in the two former
Soviet member states, the ranking within
these groups is rather surprising: the
evidence implies a somewhat larger effect
in Romania than Hungary, and in Ukraine
relative to Russia.
Turning to the effect of privatization to
foreign investors, Figure 3 shows results
for the OLS, FE, and FE&FT methods.
Again, adding firm-fixed effects and firmspecific trends diminishes the estimated
effects. By contrast with the overall
privatization effects of Figure 2, however,
in all cases the estimates of the foreign
effects remain large, and in all cases they
are much larger than the estimates of the
overall effects. Moreover, the foreign
effects vary much less across countries
than the overall effects, suggesting that
foreign investors tend to have similar
positive effects on privatized companies
across a range of types of economies.
Conclusions
These findings strongly support the
view that privatization usually raises
productivity, and they provide some
support for the view that the method of
privatization matters. The only relevant
distinction that can be directly measured
in the Upjohn study is predominantly
foreign versus predominantly domestic
ownership, and a key result of the
study is strong evidence that foreign
privatization has a bigger impact
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than domestic privatization in all
four countries. Further evidence that
privatization method matters comes from
cross-country comparisons. The largest
cross-country differences are between the
two East European countries (Hungary
and Romania) versus the two former
Soviet Republics (Russia and Ukraine),
which may be attributed to differences in
the “quality” of privatization, especially

Not all the results are consistent
with this “regional divide,”
nor with the interpretation that
the method of privatization
drives its effectiveness in
raising firm productivity.
the extent of concentrated outside
ownership. In this sense, the results in
this study put Djankov and Murrell’s
(2002) hypothesis of such a difference
between Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union on much firmer ground.
Not all the results are consistent
with this “regional divide,” nor with
the interpretation that the method of
privatization drives its effectiveness in
raising firm productivity. Most clearly,
this can be seen from the ordering of
the magnitude of privatization effects,
with Romania’s larger than Hungary’s
and Ukraine’s larger than Russia’s.
This ranking is inconsistent both with
superior privatization policies in Hungary
compared to Romania and Russia
compared to Ukraine, as well as with

the ratings of these countries of their
“progress in transition” by international
agencies.
A further inconsistency appears
from a comparison of the overall and
foreign effects. Foreign privatizations
are always carried out through sales in
all four countries, but while domestic
privatizations are also sales in Hungary,
they are less likely to be sales in Romania
and still less likely to be so in Russia
and Ukraine. Thus, if sales produce
better productivity effects than other
methods of privatization, the difference
between the foreign and overall effects
should be smallest in Hungary, second
smallest in Romania, and greatest in
Russia and Ukraine. But the data show
large differences between the foreign and
overall effects in all four countries, and
the difference is as large for Hungary as
for Romania.
Finally, the result that the productivity
effects of foreign privatizations are
large and of similar magnitude for all
these countries calls into question the
view that complementary aspects of the
macroeconomic or business environment
alter the effectiveness of privatization,
unless foreign firms are less sensitive
to such conditions. The cross-country
variation in the productivity effects
of privatization remains an important
question to address in future research.
John S. Earle is a senior economist at the
Upjohn Institute.
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